Hold Wall Street managers to account

Posted on September 16, 2017September 25, 2019 by j.giglio

At 1:45 a.m. on Monday, Sept. 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., the fourth largest investment bank, sought Chapter 11 protection in the biggest bankruptcy proceeding ever filed. There are many reasons why Lehman failed and responsibility is shared by auditors, government officials, regulators, and credit rating agencies.

Looking back, much of the blame for Lehman’s failure and the ensuing financial meltdown that led to the Great Recession resided with senior executives, aka professional managers, in the financial markets who did a poor job of allocating capital and managing risk. They acted less like stewards of their firms and more like the keepers of a guild, accountable only to themselves and focused on short-term results at the expense of long-term performance.

The failure to understand that there are huge risks associated with the pursuit of high returns was a major contributor to the financial meltdown. One way to avoid repeating this disaster would be to require top managers in industries that are important to the public welfare to earn government licenses that testify to their qualifications, just like physicians and lawyers, who must pass tough state exams, and accountants, who must also demonstrate a certain number of years of successful professional work in their field to gain a certified public accountant license.

Why not have the same rigorous licensing requirements for professional managers before they are permitted to hold top management jobs in critical industries and public-sector positions? It has become clear that the challenges of managing large organizations have grown to such a level of complexity that only individuals with the right mix of skills can effectively meet them.

One way to begin professionalizing management is to require anyone graduating with a management degree to pass a comprehensive federal or state exam that tests their mastery of the fundamental body of knowledge they allegedly learned, including accounting, finance, statistics, data analysis and organizational behavior.

During the financial meltdown, Lehman’s top executives could have by no means been described as competent. Ditto for Merrill Lynch, AIG, and so many other firms. Finding incompetent executives among this crowd was like finding sand on the beach; they were clueless to the real dangers of excessive risk taking in the form of the lack of protective equity capital and massive use of leverage built around short-term borrowings.

Despite earning more than managers in any of the world’s other major industries, they were like irresponsible children who had somehow gained access to Cold War missile control rooms, playing with the shiny buttons that could launch nuclear warheads against an unsuspecting world.

Which they ultimately did, wiping out more than $11 trillion of wealth in the process and leaving the American taxpayer to clean up the mess.

In addition to core technical skills, a management licensure test should measure the ability to think critically and consider the moral consequences of decisions. Is it too much to expect a management graduate to be educated about how to leverage the power of markets to create a better world rather than serving only their own selfish interests? Or to possess the ability to think critically, which allows them to solve problems beyond those addressed by their functional training?

For sure, such an examination would increase employers’ faith in a graduates’ competence. It might be wise to make passing the test a periodic requirement to ensure that managers stay current in their knowledge and the ethical challenges posed by an ever-changing business world.

To paraphrase the philosopher George Santayana: those who fail to learn from history are destined to repeat it. The incompetence of senior managers was a driving force behind the 2008 financial meltdown from which many Americans still have not recovered nearly a decade later. The time has come to hold managers to the same standards as other professionals whose competence impacts the well-being of society.

Originally published: September 16, 2017

Fraud just another way bankers operate

Posted on October 30, 2016September 25, 2019 by j.giglio

Once upon a time, the “F” word (fraud) was in vogue when dealing with the U.S. banking community. After the savings and loan scandals of the 1980s, more than 1,100 bankers were prosecuted on felony charges and over 800 sent to prison for white-collar crimes, including top executives at many of the largest failed banks. By throwing the savings and loan bankers in jail, the federal government sent a message: if you rip people off, you will pay for it.

No more. The federal government’s response to the 2008 financial crisis couldn’t have been more unlike what it did in the wake of the savings and loan crisis. The Justice Department has taken the position that these cases are too hard to win and the size of some large banks makes it difficult to bring criminal charges against them because they threaten a bank’s existence, which would endanger the economy. This collateral consequences approach basically gives too-big-to-fail banks and their senior executives a get-out-of-jail-free card.

After the man-made 2008 financial meltdown that left millions of Americans jobless and led to a $700 billion taxpayer bailout that dwarfed the savings and loan crisis, not one Wall Street executive went to jail for the events leading up to the crisis.

There were no high-profile big banker prosecutions for the widespread mortgage fraud and financial chicanery that fueled the bubble. These bankers were too big to jail.

Sure, there were prosecutions of small fish like mortgage brokers and loan officers, which is fine if you believe the fraud took place at the bottom of the food chain.

There were billions of dollars in civil settlements but no serious criminal prosecutions.

The notion of accountability is becoming an endangered species. Regulators still treat the banking industry with velvet gloves. Standard fare involves a firm paying a big fine with shareholder money and treating it as a corporate expense that in certain cases is tax deductible. The company promises never to commit such a crime again and in the final analysis it is just a cost of doing business.

For example, Wells Fargo got its rear-end in a sling when it was revealed that since 2011, thousands of employees secretly opened more than two million bogus bank and credit card accounts using unauthorized customer names and signatures.

The fraud was so common that employees had a name for it: sandbagging. The firm fired 5,300 employees involved in the scandal who were trying to hit steep sales targets and refunded $2.6 million in customer fees.

Here again, the government got its pound of flesh in fines rather than by prosecuting wrongdoers. WFC was fined $100 million by the federal Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, $35 million by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and $50 million by the city and county of Los Angeles. The $185 million total amounts to three days of profit for the bank. Last week the California attorney general’s office announced it is conducting a criminal investigation into whether employees at San Francisco-based Wells Fargo committed identity theft in violation of state law during the sales practice scandal.

Also, the U.S. Department of Labor is promising a “top-to-bottom” review of the firm.

It is unclear whether the investigation will focus on employees at the bottom of the food chain or senior executives, the banking industry’s untouchables. But if recent history is any guide, the biggest fish face little risk of prosecution. They may have created the cross-selling practices but were not the ones creating the fake accounts.

There is no mystery here as the American public continues to watch ordinary citizens turned into a veritable basket of deplorables and jailed for minor offenses while the most powerful walk away unpunished and with complete impunity.

As Cassius says in “Julius Caesar,” “The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, but in ourselves.”

Originally Published: Oct 30, 2016

The merger that hurt

Posted on September 3, 2016September 25, 2019 by j.giglio

Why the demise of Glass-Steagall helped trigger the 2008 financial meltdown that cost millions of Americans their jobs, homes and savings

This month is the eighth anniversary of the all-enveloping 2008 financial crisis. Wall Street apologists and many of their Washington, D.C., acolytes argue there is zero evidence that the takedown of the Glass-Steagall Act had anything to do with the meltdown, but the assertion ignores the role the rule of unintended consequences played in the crisis.

Glass-Steagall was enacted during the Great Depression to separate Main Street from Wall Street, creating a firewall between consumer-oriented commercial banks and riskier, more speculative investment banks. During the six-plus decades the law was in effect, there were few large bank failures and no financial panics comparable to what happened in 2008.

In the 1980s, Sandy Weil, one of the godfathers of modem finance, began acquiring control of various banks, insurance companies, brokerage firms and similar financial institutions. These were cobbled together into a conglomerate under the umbrella of a publicly traded insurance company known as Travelers Group.

In 1998 Weil proposed a $70 billion merger with Citicorp, America’s second-largest commercial bank. It would be the biggest corporate merger in American history and create the world’s largest one-stop financial services institution.

Touting the need to remain competitive in a globalized industry and customers’ desire for a “one-stop shop” (a supermarket bank), both companies lobbied hard for regulatory approval of the merger. Advocates argued that customers preferred to do all their business -life insurance, credit cards, mortgages, retail brokerage, retirement planning, checking accounts, commercial banking, and securities underwriting and trading -with one financial institution.

But the merger’s one-stop-shopping approach would make a mockery of the Glass-Steagall firewall. The proposed transaction violated its prohibition of combining a depository institution, such as a bank holding company, with other financial companies, such as investment banks and brokerage houses.

Citigroup successfully obtained a temporary waiver for the violation, then intensified decades-old efforts to eliminate the last vestige of depression-era financial market regulation so it could complete themerger. A Republican Congress passed the Financial Services Modernization Act and President Clinton signed it in November 1999. It permitted insurance companies, investment banks, and commercial banks to combine and compete across products and markets, hammering the final nail into the coffin of Glass Steagall.

Now liberated, the banking industry embarked upon a decade of concentrating financial power in fewer and fewer hands. Acquisitions of investment banks by commercial banks, such as FleetBoston buying Robertson Stephens and Bank of America buying Montgomery Securities, became commonplace.

Traditional investment banks suddenly faced competition from publicly traded commercial banks with huge reserves of federally insured deposits. The investment banks faced pressure to deliver returns on equity comparable to those of the new financial supermarkets, which also put competitive pressure on traditional investment banking businesses such as mergers and acquisitions, underwriting, and sales and trading.

In response, the investment banks sought to raise their leverage limits so they could borrow more money to engage in proprietary, speculative trading activities. In 2005 they convinced the Securities Exchange Commission to abolish the “net capital” rule that restricted the amount of debt these firms could take from 12-1 to 30-1, meaning the banks could borrow 30 dollars for every dollar of equity they held.

By 2008, increased leverage and speculation on toxic assets would ravage investment banking, leading to the collapse, merger, or restructuring of all five major Wall Street investment banks. During a six month period, Bear Stearns collapsed into the arms of JP Morgan, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy protection, Merrill Lynch merged into Bank of America, and Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley converted to bank holding companies, giving them access to precious short-term funds from the Federal Reserve’s discount window.

The demise of Glass-Steagall may not have been at the heart of the 2008 financial crisis but it certainly contributed to the lunacy of financial deregulation. Had the law not been neutered, it would have lessened the depth and breath of the crisis that cost millions of Americans their jobs, homes and savings.

Originally Published: Sep 3, 2016

Dancing on the edge of absurdity

Posted on October 25, 2014September 25, 2019 by j.giglio

There can be little doubt that one of the causes of the 2008 financial crisis was diminished regulatory control , the seeds of which were sown during the three preceding decades.

Recent legislation re-regulates financial markets, but attracting the best and brightest to regulatory jobs is proving to be a major challenge. The congressionally authorized Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, a not-for-profit self-regulator, may offer a solution to the problem.

Beginning with the Carter administration and accelerating during Reagan’s presidency, the banking industry, among others, was steadily deregulated. Not only were leveraging requirements continually lowered but watchdog organizations such as the Securities and Exchange Commission were weakened both by legislation and the appointment of free-market advocates.

Successive administrations were enthusiastic advocates of deregulation. The dominant economic paradigm was that markets are efficient and inherently maximize welfare and work best when managed least. Moreover, with free-market advocates in charge of regulatory agencies such as the SEC, many existing laws were ignored or rarely enforced.

For example, observers repeatedly warned the Securities and Exchange Commission about suspected irregularities at Bernard Madoff’s investment firm, which was later revealed to be a multi-billion dollar Ponzi scheme. In spite of several warnings, no serious investigation was undertaken until after the firm’s spectacular collapse.

One reason offered for poor financial regulation is that government agencies are seriously disadvantaged when it comes to attracting the best and the brightest. The salaries of elected officials tend to impose an artificial ceiling on how much public employees can be paid. Even though these ceilings ignore marketplace realities, elected officials are reluctant to raise them by advocating higher salaries for themselves because it looks bad to voters.

Consequently, Americans are told that many government regulatory agencies lack the talent to regulate financial markets because they can’t pay the going rate for good people. Thus, the regulatory agencies’ best and the brightest flock to higher-paying jobs with firms they regulate. This leaves the public to complain that our regulatory agencies are less effective than they need to be.

But not all regulators are underpaid. According to the Bond Buyer ‘s annual salary survey of 21 industry regulatory groups, compensation for the chairman and CEO of Financial Industry Regulatory Authority , which oversees the 4,100 securities firms and over 636,000 stockbrokers in the United States, was $2.63 million in 2013.

The perks aren’t bad either, he receives $20,000 annually for admission fees, dues, and house charges to one club each in the Big Apple and Washington, and up to $20,000 annually for personal finance and tax counseling, as well as spousal travel for certain business-related events. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority also paid four of its top executives more than $1 million in 2013. These folks can spend more for one dinner than the average American -whose wages have been flat for decades – spends on a vacation.

Let’s put these salaries in perspective: The President earns $400,000 annually. Janet Yellen, the chair of the Federal Reserve who has sway over the entire world economy as opposed to just American stockbrokers, earns $201,700. Securities and Exchange Commission Chair Mary Jo White makes $165,300. White’s predecessor at the SEC, Mary Shapiro, was fresh from running Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, which gave her a $9 million severance to ease the pain of a low government salary.

These are clearly difficult times for national financial regulators. They are challenged with implementing hideously complicated Dodd-Frank legislation that is supposed to safeguard and stabilize the financial system to avoid another financial crisis.

At 2,319 pages, the Dodd-Frank Act is the most far-reaching financial regulatory undertaking since the 1930s, requiring regulatory agencies that had been withering to enact 447 rules and complete 63 reports and 59 studies within tight congressional deadlines.

It may be at the edge of absurdity, but just maybe the best way to attract the best and the brightest would be to expand the number of one-percenters by outsourcing all regulation to not-for-profit entities such as Financial Industry Regulatory Authority.

originally published: October 25, 2014

Dancing on the edge of absurdity

Posted on October 25, 2014September 25, 2019 by j.giglio

There can be little doubt that one of the causes of the 2008 financial crisis was diminished regulatory control , the seeds of which were sown during the three preceding decades.

Consequently, Americans are told that many government regulatory agencies lack the talent to regulate financial markets because they can’t pay the going rate for good people. Thus, the regulatory agencies best and the brightest flock to higher-paying jobs with firms they regulate. This leaves the public to complain that our regulatory agencies are less effective than they need to be.

originally published: October 25, 2014

Federal Reserve, Americans must listen to Carmen Segarra

Posted on October 11, 2014September 25, 2019 by j.giglio

To most people, the name Carmen Segarra means nothing. But to a few, her fate validates their worst suspicions about regulators who exist to protect the interests of the regulated.

Segarra is a former bank examiner whose job was to be the Goldman Sachs’ watchdog for the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which regulates many large New York banks and is the Federal Reserve System’s primary connection to financial and credit markets. She secretly recorded 46 hours of conversations inside the Federal Reserve and Goldman Sachs and released the tapes to Pro-Publica and the radio show, “This American Life.” You can listen to the episode online at ThisAmericanLife.org.

Segarra was fired by the Federal Reserve after seven months, apparently because she refused to budge on her findings that Reserve officials on numerous occasions seemed to treat Goldman Sachs with too much deference. In particular, she insisted based on her fact-finding that the company did not have a policy on conflicts of interest that met regulatory standards.

Her story underscores how regulators have become too cozy with the industry they are charged with policing. Academics call it “regulatory capture.”

This is hardly breaking news. Lax external oversight was among the chief reasons the world’s biggest economy was brought to the brink of depression in 2008. Put bluntly, regulators have to shoulder some of the blame for the financial apocalypse that unleashed the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression of 1929, at a galactic cost to the American taxpayer, and threw millions of Americans out of their jobs and homes. The economy still bears deep scars.

The 2008 financial crisis demonstrated more than ever that the self-regulating financial system was pure myth.

The public has come to catch the joke that on Wall Street, if you represent everyone there is no conflict of interest. Transparency and the financial services industry don’t exactly waltz around arm in arm. In fact, for some bankers transparency is an occupational hazard.

The coverage in the media since the Sept. 26 release of Carmen Segarra’s recordings of Federal Reserve officials not doing their jobs has been minimal. Hers is not a household name like Edward Snowden, who leaked classified information from the National Security Agency that advertised security vulnerabilities and spying on Americans and international leaders.

It may be that the public’s default mode is indifference; they would like to care but there’s just too much going on at the moment. The average American is too busy worrying about making ends meet. And after all, they already knew that banks hold regulators hostage.

Sure, Sens. Elizabeth Warren, D-Mass., and Sherrod Brown, D-Ohio, both members of the Senate Banking Committee, want Congress to investigate Goldman Sachs’ relationship with the Federal Reserve, but it’s more likely that the issue will quietly disappear.

Wall Street makes generous campaign contributions to the guardians of democracy in Washington and spends big on lobbyists to communicate their policy preferences to government apparatchiks. Despite the rosy rhetoric, that makes it highly unlikely that Congress will hold hearings.

Another problem is that many people see government regulatory jobs as stepping stones to lucrative private-sector careers. They develop useful contacts with key employees in the private-sector firms whose behavior they are supposed to regulate and quietly impress these contacts that their “hearts are in the right place.” In this culture of coziness, nothing should be taken at face value.

In the final analysis you can write all the tough regulations you want to regulate the financial system and its participants to prevent future financial debacles. But for those regulations to have any teeth, they must be accompanied by closing the revolving door between lavish private-sector executive suites and the basic steel-desk offices of government agencies.

originally published: October 11, 2014

Alan Greenspan’s downfall

Posted on April 26, 2014September 25, 2019 by j.giglio

In the wake of the 2008 global economic crash, the once-esteemed name of Alan Greenspan doesn’t carry much weight. In the final analysis, his downfall came because he just couldn’t bear to close down the party.

Greenspan was appointed Federal Reserve chair by President Reagan in 1987. He succeeded the legendary Paul Volker, who is credited with having broken the back of virulent 1970s inflation by choking off growth in the money supply.

Because of his business background and admitted “Libertarian Republican” ideology , Greenspan was expected to continue emphasizing his predecessor’s low-inflation policies.

By any objective measure, Greenspan merited the title “History’s most qualified central banker.” He was, after all, no ivory tower academic lost in the stacks of some dusty library without hands-on experience in the real world. In fact, his vast and varied range of life experiences truly made him a quintessential man of the world.

As an undergraduate during the 1940s, he studied clarinet at the Julliard School of Music. He then toured the country as a saxophonist in a popular jazz band.

During this time he developed a sideline preparing income tax returns for fellow musicians. He then enrolled at New York University to study economics and became a member of an informal discussion group led by Ayn Rand, the famous libertarian philosopher who, through her best-selling novels “The Fountainhead” and “Atlas Shrugged,” was instrumental in resurrecting free market economic theory.

After NYU, he went to work for an economics consulting firm whose clients included Fortune 500 companies. He eventually became the firm’s owner and CEO (so he knew what it was like to have to meet payroll) and made himself a nice fortune in the process, earning an honorable discharge from the financial wars.

He had his first federal government experience during the Ford administration, when he chaired the President’s Council of Economic Advisors. After that, he returned to his consulting firm.

Almost immediately after being named Fed chair, Greenspan was confronted by the massive October 1987 stock market crash. He responded by flooding the financial markets with liquidity, which prevented a Wall Street bloodbath from laying a glove on Main Street.

During all these years, he led an exceedingly full life as an active pursuer of interesting women. His romantic targets included celebrities like Barbara Walters and NBC’s Andrea Mitchell, who became his second wife while he was Fed chair.

When a 1998 hedge fund meltdown triggered concerns that sizable losses to the firm’s creditors (mainly large Wall Street banks) would cause credit markets to freeze up, Greenspan worked behind the scenes to have the Federal Reserve Bank of New York orchestrate a bailout of the hedge fund by these banks. The Fed pumped up the money supply to depress interest rates, thereby making life easier for the banks.

Then the dot-com bubble burst, wiping out more than $5 trillion (that’s “t” as in “trauma”) in stock market value among tech companies by the end of 2002, helped along by the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

These events and others gave Greenspan plenty of excuses to keep interest rates low by pumping up the money supply, to oppose financial regulation, and arrange bailouts when banks got into trouble. All of which he repeated to the point where they opened wide the door for the housing and derivative booms.

He largely ignored the ruling guideline expressed by former Fed Chair William McChesney Martin, who supposedly said, “The Fed’s job is to take the punch bowl away just when the party’s going good.”

So when it comes to managing the money supply, the Fed should presumably grow it more slowly during good economic times and more rapidly during recessions.

But Greenspan’s guideline was to keep the party going full blast with generous bowls of vodka-spiked punch until the guests were staggering around the room, stumbling into the furniture, singing bawdy songs, knocking over floor lamps and throwing up on the carpet.

And then bring in the Fed to clean up the mess.

originally published: April 26, 2014

‘Caveat Emptor’ no help to investors

Posted on August 31, 2013September 25, 2019 by j.giglio

In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the conventional wisdom is that financial markets need to be more tightly regulated. That is certainly true, but the problem is as much about who is doing the regulating as it is about the regulations themselves.

The 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act represents America’s biggest financial regulatory reform since the Great Depression, but its success will ultimately depend on having competent and honest regulators who cannot be compromised by lucrative employment opportunities dangled by the regulated.

The dominant global financial players’ failure to rein in their greed set the stage for the last economic crisis, and it was hardly the first time; under-regulated markets went on a murderous rampage.

Common-sense regulation ensures that a buyer can be confident that the item being purchased possesses all the advantages the seller claims, and that any disadvantages are clearly identified. This allows the buyer to make a rational decision about whether the item is actually worth the price. Many libertarians assume sellers will always inform the buyer of pertinent factual information because the seller knows that economic success ultimately depends on a reputation among potential buyers.

At the other extreme is the idea that sellers are inherently Times Square shell-game scammers who can’t be trusted to provide clear, honest, information about their products’ advantages and disadvantages, so the buyer must accept sole responsibility for obtaining all necessary information about whatever products he or she may purchase. This is the spirit behind the popular Latin phrase: “caveat emptor,” or “let the buyer beware.” Responsibility for regulating private firms rests with government agencies staffed by highly qualified managers and analysts who regard “public service” as the noblest of callings and their surest path to heaven. ·There are at least two real-world problems with this concept.

The first is that it depends on a large supply of trust fund babies to staff these government agencies free to devote their professional lives to “public service.” Sadly, the supply is nowhere near sufficient. Most of the intelligent and well-educated people they require emerge from graduate school burdened by crushing student loan debt that forces them to opt for the most lucrative job they can find.

The second problem flows naturally from the first. Many gifted, well-educated, young people see government regulatory agency job as stepping stones to lucrative private sector careers. They can develop useful contacts with key players with the firms they are supposed to regulate and impress the contacts that their “hearts are in the right place” as far as the regulated firm is concerned.

So it’s scarcely a surprise that there’s a parade of people marching back and forth between lavish private sector executive suites and the basic steel-desk offices of agencies like the Securities and Exchange Commission.

If we want federal regulatory agencies that prevent financial debacles, we have to end close the revolving door.

To make that work, we will need to address the economic concerns of gifted but highly indebted people. We could pay them much higher salaries for government jobs or subsidize their student loan burdens in return for their committing to careers in public service. Perhaps we could make up some of the difference with generous pensions, health benefits, and perhaps even offer them college scholarship for their children.

It’s awfully hard to be serious about regarding financial markets when you need a program to tell the regulators from the regulated.

originally published: August 31, 2013

Cyprus crisis can’t happen in the U.S.- right?

Posted on April 7, 2013September 25, 2019 by j.giglio

“Neither a borrower nor a lender be,” prattled Polonius to Laertes in Shakespeare’s “Hamlet.” Well, maybe. Last month, the European Central Bank, the European Commission and the International Monetary Fund decided that Cyprus needed a fast 17 billion euro bailout. They proposed to offer the tiny island 10 billion euros and demanded that depositors in Cypriot banks fork over the remaining 7 billion.

Specifically, they proposed taxing bank deposits. Depositors with more than 100,000 euros in their account would be faced with a 9.9 percent tax while those with less would see a 6.75 percent levy.

As you can imagine, depositors rushed to withdraw funds from Cypriot banks before the measure went into effect. So the authorities shut down the banks for several weeks and instituted capital controls. This had to be unsettling for retirees and the working class, as well as small businesses that need to make payroll using their bank accounts.

Setting aside for now how the crisis was averted and whether something similar could happen here, in the real world few businesses of any size can operate without access to short-term credit to smooth out mismatches in their normal cash flows.

Suppose your family’s widget factory pays its employees every Friday. That means a weekly cash outflow. But most of your prime customers are wholesale distributors who pay for purchases from firms like yours on the last day of the month following widget deliveries. So you have four payroll outflows for each injection of cash from sales.

Like the overwhelming majority of businesses, you cover these cash flow mismatches by drawing down a credit line from your local bank each week to make payroll and repay the drawdowns as soon as payment is received.

But one Friday morning when you get on your PC to access your firm’s bank accounts and transfer enough cash from your credit line to cover payroll checks, you see a chilling message on your screen: “All credit lines are frozen until further notice.”

You scrounge around among your firm’s bank accounts and come up with enough cash to cover this week’s payroll, leaving you pretty well tapped out until a big group of customer payments is due to arrive in three weeks. But what about your next three payrolls?

One option is to simply close the factory and lay off your employees until the payments arrive. But a closed factory doesn’t produce widgets, so you can’t deliver to your customers, who may tum to other suppliers. In any case, your future cash inflows will be lower, which means smaller profits.

Another option is to close the factory and lay off your employees for just a week, when you try to find enough emergency cash somewhere to cover the next two weeks of payroll. Losing only one week of production will reduce your loss, but what if you can’t find the money?

The widget company’s experience isn’t just limited to Cyprus. It was repeated a few million times in the United States during the fall of 2008. The results were massive layoffs, lost wages (which meant less consumer spending) and lost company profits. All of which made a disastrous recession even worse.

Why did this happen in the U.S.?

Because too many banks woke up one morning to find that some of the dicey unregulated derivative securities they held in their portfolios had lost most of their value. In a panic, they tried to conserve as much available cash as they could by freezing lending to businesses and individuals alike.

Back in Cyprus, the banks became a tax haven for overseas depositors. They then invested the money in Greek bonds to generate big returns. When the bonds tanked, the banks were on the verge of bankruptcy and needed a bailout.

But there’s no need to be alarmed. It can’t happen here. The American economy has been strong for months now, the stock market is rising, and your 401(k) is going through the roof. Right?

originally posted: April 6, 2013

The tigers of Wall Street

Posted on March 24, 2013September 25, 2019 by j.giglio

The Senate recently held a hearing to look into a series of trades that cost JPMorgan Chase over $6 billion last year, some of which was funded by federally insured deposits. They have come to be known as the “whale trades,” but beyond indicating the scale ofthe loss, the description is a misnomer. You see, likening whales to rogue traders is unfair to whales. A more accurate metaphor is the Siberian tiger, one of the most awesome creatures on earth.

The Siberian tiger was brilliantly engineered to be the world’s ultimate killer, far surpassing the shark, the barracuda and the piranha. Tigers kill with their fearsome combination of size, speed, strength and cleverness, not to mention razor-sharp claws and teeth.

But tigers don’t kill just to meet the Darwinian imperative of satisfying their ravenous hunger. They also kill for the sheer joy of it, preferably while inflicting the maximum amount of torture on their terrified victims. It’s just their nature.

An example of this occurred on Christmas Day 2007 at the San Francisco Zoo, when three teenage boys who had consumed too much beer thought it would be great fun to yell taunts and obscenities at Tatiana, the zoo’s 400-pound Siberian tiger, from outside her enclosure.

After the boys had tired of the game and started on their way, Tatiana sought vengeance. She leaped to the top of the 12-foot wall surrounding her enclosure, hid behind some bushes along the pathway she figured the boys would take, and leaped at them with a mighty roar as they passed.

Tatiana killed the first boy instantly with a bite to the neck . She whacked the other two into semi consciousness with blows from her powerful front paws. But as she set upon them, a team of zookeepers reached the scene and killed Tatiana with a shot to the head from a high-powered rifle, saving the lives of the remaining two boys.

For all their strength, intelligence and murderous instincts, Siberian tigers are in danger of becoming extinct in their natural habitats, because each adult requires roughly 400 square miles of unspoiled wilderness stocked with tasty animals to survive on its own. A burgeoning human population and development pressures are making such outsized land hunger increasingly impractical.

So the best future for Siberian tigers is in regulated environments like the Bronx Zoo’s Tiger Mountain. There they can roam large wilderness compounds that replicate their natural habitats as they are fed fresh meat daily so they no longer have to kill other animals. They are tended by skilled keepers who entice them into playing games that delight human spectators and maintain their physical fitness and fighting instincts without requiring them to indulge in the worst aspects of their serial-killer nature.

In many respects, markets are also serial killers. From a social perspective, the best future is for them to also exist in regulated environments where their survival is pretty much assured, their many benefits can be harnessed to serve the public good, and the downsides of their nature are properly restrained.

As the financial meltdown of 2008 reminded us, under-regulated markets have a long history of going on periodic murderous rampages, just like hungry tigers. They rip jobs and homes away from millions of people who depend on them, gulp down trillions of dollars in hard-earned savings, and ravage the flesh of thousands of small businesses whose bones are flung on the ash heaps of bankruptcy.

There are two possible solutions:

One is to learn how to regulate markets and their participants sensibly, to rein in their potentially murderous behavior before it gets out of hand by building a system in which the ups and downs of capitalism are sufficiently tempered to avoid destructive booms and busts.

You don’t want to know what the second solution is. But if you happen to be an immigrant from the former Soviet Union, you already know what it’s like to be subjected to absolute state authority.

originally published: March 23, 2013